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I.  Introduction
Congress authorizes district courts to
assess civil penalties against any person
who violates the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”).1 Penalties assessed pursuant to
the Act serve an important purpose
because they prevent economic gain at
the expense of the environment.2 It is
often economically beneficial for a com-
pany to delay the commitment of funds
for compliance with environmental regu-
lations and to avoid operation and main-
tenance expenses.3 Civil penalties are
intended to deter this behavior. 
In United States v. Smithfield Foods, the
Virginia district court stated: “The main
purpose of the penalty is to deter the vio-
lator and others from committing future
violations.”4 In Tull v. United States, the US
Supreme Court further emphasized the
deterrent aspects of the CWA stating,
“[c]ongress wanted the district court to
consider the need for retribution and
deterrence, in addition to restitution,
when it imposed civil penalties.”5 To
attain this goal of deterrence, the penalty
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must deprive the party of any economic
benefit that the party would realize
through noncompliance with the CWA
and include a punitive component which
accounts for the degree of seriousness
and/ or willfulness of the violations.6
To reinforce the deterrent and puni-
tive nature of the act, Congress set a par-
ticularly high maximum for civil penalties.
However, although the court may order a
violator to pay the maximum penalty, the
court has broad discretion to assess an
appropriate civil penalty in light of the
specific facts of a case.
This article explores cases in which
courts have assessed penalties and exam-
ines how each court arrived at its respec-
tive penalty figure.  Part I sets forth the
structure that courts use to assess civil
penalties, including the way in which
courts use the six factors listed in CWA
section 309(d).  Part I also discusses the
two most common methods courts use to
assess penalties.  Part II discusses the
factors that should be emphasized in
order to make a strong case for assessing
substantial penalties against a defendant
as well as the level of proof generally
expected.
II.  Structure of Penalty Assessment
Congress authorizes courts, upon
finding a violation of the CWA, to assess
appropriate civil penalties under section
309(d) of the CWA.7 Section 309(d) pro-
vides six factors for courts to consider
when determining the amount of civil
penalties.  A court must consider each of
the enumerated factors, as well as any
other factors they determine to be impor-
tant, when assessing a fair penalty.8
Although the CWA provides these factors,
basically a framework for deciding civil
penalties, the CWA does not specify a
method for calculating them.  Because the
CWA does not mandate a specific process,
courts are free to use their discretion
when choosing the appropriate
approach.9 The two approaches most
commonly applied by courts are the “top-
down” or “bottom-up” approaches.
A.  Methods of Calculating Civil 
Penalties for CWA Violations
1.  “Top-down” Approach
In the “top-down” approach, the
court determines the maximum possible
penalty, and then reduces it according to
an examination of the six factors enumer-
ated in Section 309(d).10 Courts calculate
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6.  Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc., v. The City of New York, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 41, 48 (N.D. N.Y. 2003) (citing United
States v. Mun. Auth. Of Union Township, 929 F.
Supp. 800, 806 (M.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 150 F.3d 259
(3d Cir. 1998)).
7.  33 U.S.C. §1319(d), 1365(a) (2003); Universal
Tool, 786 F. Supp. at 746.
8.  Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1141 (11th Cir.
1990).
9.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 354.
10.  Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar
Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 574-576 (5th Cir.
1996); Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 80 (3d Cir. 1990); Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d at
1142; Universal Tool, 786 F. Supp. at 746-747.
the maximum penalty by multiplying the
maximum penalty amount ($25,000 or
$27,500 depending on the date of the 
violations) by the number of violations
per day.11
In determining the number of viola-
tions, courts look to a violator’s permit
requirements.  In cases involving permit
violations where there are many different
pollutants with different acceptable lim-
its, “[e]ach limit is a separate, distinct
requirement of the Permit which can be
violated.  Accordingly, where multiple vio-
lations of defendants’ Permit occur in one
day, the maximum penalty on that day
may exceed $25,000 [or $27,500].”12
Furthermore, each day that a defen-
dant fails to comply with reporting
requirements is considered to be a day of
violation.
For example, in Smithfield Foods, an
employee of the defendant company
destroyed the company’s laboratory
analysis records and bench sheets in vio-
lation of its permit, which required the
defendant to maintain records for at least
three years.13 The defendant company
did not have the required records covering
a period of two years and five months.14
Each day of that twenty-nine month peri-
od constituted a separate violation of
defendant’s permit.  At $25,000 a viola-
tion, the maximum penalty that could
have been imposed was more than $21
million.15
As illustrated by the case above, max-
imum penalties can reach extraordinary
amounts.  After calculating the maximum
penalty, courts may, and often do, adjust
downward based on the mitigating factors
listed in Section 309(d).16 This top-down
method is fairly straightforward as long as
the number of violations is easily ascer-
tainable.  Otherwise, the “bottom-up”
approach, as discussed below, may be
more appropriate.
2.  “Bottom-up” Approach
The other method used by courts to
assess penalties is known as the “bottom-
up” approach.  When using the bottom up
approach, courts first determine the eco-
nomic benefit that the defendant gained
by failing to comply with the CWA.  This
economic benefit serves as the baseline
amount of the civil penalty.  The court
then adjusts the penalty upward or down-
ward based on the remaining five factors
set forth in Section 309(d).17 The court
may choose this method if the economic
benefit can be calculated based on the
facts of the case, or if the number of 
violations is difficult or impossible to
ascertain.
A court may choose not to use this
approach because an exact figure repre-
senting economic benefit may be difficult
to support with adequate proof.18
However, to overcome this difficulty, the
Third Circuit found that the plaintiff’s bur-
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11.  Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 573-574.
12.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 341.
13.  Id.
14.  Id.
15.  Id.
16.  Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 573 (citing Tyson
Foods, 897 F.2d at 1142).
17.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 354.
18.  Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 80 (citing S. REP.
No. 50, 25 (1985)).
den for proving the economic benefit “will
not require an elaborate or burden-
some evidentiary showing.  Reasonable
approximations of economic benefit will
suffice.”19
For example, in United States v.
Municipal Authority of Union Township,20 the
Third Circuit awarded civil penalties using
the bottom up approach.  In that case, the
defendant, a dairy, could have remained
in compliance with its permit by reducing
production.21 Knowing this, the defen-
dant chose not to reduce its production in
order to prevent the loss of a valued cus-
tomer.22 The court calculated the eco-
nomic benefit to be the amount that the
defendant dairy would have lost if it had
forfeited the valued customer ($417,000
each year).23 The court assessed a penal-
ty on the defendant in the amount of the
profit earned from the valued customer
multiplied by the number of years that the
defendant violated the CWA
($2,015,500).24 The court held that this
penalty achieved the leveling of the play-
ing field intended by Congress when it
enacted the CWA.25
B.  Six Factors Enumerated in the 
Clean Water Act
Courts have broad discretion to
decide which approach, “top-down” or
“bottom-up,” will best suit each situation,
based on the facts and on the court’s
judgment.  After the court decides
whether it will use the maximum penalty
or the economic benefit as the base fig-
ure, the court must evaluate the impact of
each of the six factors enumerated in
Section 309(d) to arrive at a final penalty.
Section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act
provides that “any person who violates . . .
this title, or any permit condition or limi-
tation . . . shall be subject to a civil penal-
ty not to exceed [$27,500] per day for each
violation.  In determining the amount of a
civil penalty the court shall consider: 
[1] the seriousness of the viola-
tion or violations, [2] the eco-
nomic benefit (if any) resulting
from the violation, [3] any histo-
ry of such violations, [4] any
good-faith efforts to comply with
the applicable requirements, [5]
the economic impact of the
penalty on the violator, and [6]
such other matters as justice
may require.26
District courts are to take into
account each of the enumerated factors as
well as any other factors they determine
to be important to imposing fair penalty.27
To determine the seriousness of a viola-
tion, courts consider the frequency and
severity of violations, and the effect that
the violations have on the environment
and on the public.28
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19.  Id.
20.  Union Township, 150 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 1998).
21.  Id. at 262.
22.  Id.
23.  Id.
24.  Id. at 265.
25.  Id. at 267.
26.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), See also 40 C.F.R. §
19.1-19.4 (Dec. 31, 1996). Prior to December 31,
1996, the maximum penalty for CWA violations
was $25,000 per day for each violation.  The maxi-
mum penalty for violations occurring after
December 31, 1996, is $27,500.  
27.  Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d at 1141.
28.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 343.  
Courts must consider economic ben-
efit in its penalty evaluation.  A court
using the bottom-up approach will deter-
mine the economic benefit resulting from
the violation(s) and use that amount as
the starting point for its determination of
an appropriate penalty based on the
remaining five factors.  However, even for
a court using the top-down approach, the
economic benefit that the violator enjoys
as a result of violating the CWA is “[a] 
critical component of any penalty 
analysis . . . .”29
The court also examines a party’s his-
tory of CWA violations.  To determine
whether a defendant has a history of vio-
lations courts typically look to “the dura-
tion of defendants’ current violations,
whether defendants have committed sim-
ilar violations in the past, and the dura-
tion and nature of all the violations,
including whether the violations were per-
petual or sporadic.”30
The “good-faith efforts” factor is a
policy-based consideration meant to
lessen the punitive effect of a civil penalty
for a defendant who has attempted to
comply with the CWA.  Congress recog-
nized that parties often deal with complex
technological problems that may be diffi-
cult to solve, and “if a defendant can
demonstrate they have been proceeding
in a good faith attempt to come into com-
pliance with the CWA, then credit is given
under the mitigating factor of good faith
efforts.”31 However, good faith is not
assumed, and in many cases, defendants
are unable to mitigate penalties based on
this factor.
A court may reduce the civil penalty
against a party if the court determines
that imposing the maximum statutory
penalty would work an undue burden on
the defendant.32 Conversely, courts may
penalize a defendant in an amount greater
than the economic benefit it received if
loss of the economic benefit alone would
not deter the defendant, or others, from
violating the CWA in the future.33
Under the sixth factor of Section
309(d), courts may either increase or
decrease the penalty in light of other mat-
ters, such as bad-faith conduct on the part
of the violator, a violator’s attitude toward
achieving compliance, and the violator’s
ability to comply with the CWA.34 In gen-
eral, this factor provides courts with the
option to consider any other facts that it
may deem relevant.  
III.  Making the Strongest Case for 
Assessing Substantial Penalties 
In order to win a substantial penalty,
plaintiffs must address each of the six fac-
tors specifically and in detail.  In almost
every opinion awarding civil penalties,
whether using the top-down or bottom-up
approach to calculate penalties, the court
in question has analyzed each factor,
often pointing out instances where plain-
tiffs could have made a better, or more
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29.  United States v. Allegheny Ludlum. Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 2d 426, 436 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
30.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 349.
31.  Universal Tool, 786 F. Supp. at 751-752.
32.  Universal Tool, 786 F. Supp. at 753-754 (cit-
ing SPRIG of New Jersey v. Hercules, 29 ERC 1417,
1423 (D.N.J. 1989).  
33.  Id. at 353.
34.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 353.
complete, case for increased penalties.
The majority of courts use the bottom-up
approach to calculate penalties: the eco-
nomic benefit defendant gained by violat-
ing the CWA is the starting point, and the
most heavily weighed factor, in the court’s
penalty calculation.  Even in cases where
the court chooses the top-down
approach, or a hybrid approach, econom-
ic benefit is a substantial factor in a
court’s penalties analysis.  Economic ben-
efits aside, the factors weighed most
heavily by a given court tend to be fact
specific and not easily categorized into
essential and nonessential factors.  None
of the six factors alone will secure a sub-
stantial penalty, nor can any factor be
ignored completely.  However, we can
make some generalizations as to what
kinds of facts courts consider under each
of the six factors.
A.  Seriousness of the Violation or 
Violations
The ideal fact situation establishing
serious violations would consist of sever-
al, long lasting discharges of a toxic sub-
stance into protected, relatively clean
waters, resulting in provable, actual harm
to the environment, human health and
economic interests.  In reality, some less-
er degree or combination of these ele-
ments will exist.  For example, the court in
Smithfield Foods determined violations to be
severe where defendant vastly exceeded
its discharge limits, resulting in violations
that had a negative impact on the envi-
ronment and the public.  In this case,
defendant’s violations caused eutrophica-
tion and degradation of a river used for
fish spawning, commercial and recre-
ational fishing, crabbing, and shellfish
harvesting.35
1.  Number and Frequency of 
Violations 
Much has been written on methods
of counting individual violations for pur-
poses of the CWA’s penalties calculation,
so that subject will not be addressed at
length in this article.  However, the Third
Circuit has given some parameters that
are useful to keep in mind.  In Powell
Duffryn, the Third Circuit considered “386
violations over a seven year period . . . a
large number” of violations.”36 In United
States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township,
the court characterized “2,360 violations
over six years” as a “very large” number of
violations.37
In an effort to distinguish habitual
violations from isolated incidents, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has issued guidance allowing courts to
treat a single operational upset as one
violation of the CWA.  EPA’s guidance on
single operational upsets “defines an
‘exceptional’ incident as a ‘non-routine
malfunctioning of an otherwise generally
compliant facility’caused by an unusual or
extraordinary event . . . .  [A] sudden vio-
lent storm, or bursting tank . . . a single
operational upset [is] not any single non-
complying discharge.”38 In some situa-
tions, violations coincide with natural fac-
tors, such as rain.  Because the frequency
of the natural event will determine, at
76
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35.  Id. at 344-346.
36.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
37.  Id. at 431 (citing Union Township, 929 F.
Supp. 800, 807 (M.D. Pa. 1996)).
38.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 443-
444.
least in part, the number of violations
attributable to the event, such informa-
tion must be provided to the court.  In
response to an instance where plaintiffs
failed to provide such information, the court
chastised; “Plaintiffs presented insufficient
information upon which to base a finding
regarding the exact dates of rain since oper-
ations began.  The Court suspects that these
dates are numerous, but is not inclined to
factor the suspected large number of these
dates into the penalty equation based upon
mere suspicion.”39
2.  Severity of Violations
In determining the severity of permit
violations, “some courts consider the
extent to which a violator’s discharges
exceed the permit limits.”40 This consid-
eration has played a substantial role in
cases where permit limits were exceeded
by 8 percent to more than 1,000 percent41.
While not the majority view, some courts
weigh a lack of state enforcement action
against a finding that a violation is seri-
ous.  Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. provides
an example, “Texaco delayed its applica-
tion for a renewal of the . . . permit out of
fear of stricter limits.  On the other hand,
DNREC [State Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control]
has not taken legal action with regard to
this incident.”42
Most courts consider toxicity of dis-
charges in their analysis of the severity of
violations, and often weigh toxicity very
differently.  In Powell Duffryn, the district
court found a very small number, only “10
violations of toxic pollutant limits” to be
serious,43 making it easy for the court in
Allegheny Ludlum to find that a defendant
“liable for 893 days of violations of toxic
pollutant limits” had committed serious
violations.44 The Allegheny court justified
its emphasis on toxicity by stating that
“toxic pollutants generally pose a greater
threat to human life” than conventional
pollutants.45 Conversely, courts have also
found violations to be less serious based
on their perception of lack of toxic ele-
ments.  In Weber v. Trinity Meadows Raceway,
the court cited as a mitigating factor the
fact that, “raceway’s discharge of pollu-
tants is largely, if not wholly, comprised of
natural, organic materials, such as wood
shavings and equine waste, as opposed
to, for example, a toxic chemical.”46 In
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc., v. The City of New York, the Northern
District of New York found violations to be
less serious where the violative dis-
charges were not toxic and, in part, were
the result of natural conditions.47
There is a decided split among courts
regarding the seriousness of violations of
reporting requirements.  Interestingly,
both sides cite the purposes of the CWA
to bolster their position.  On one hand,
“reporting deficiencies do not produce the
type of direct environmental impact which
is the primary purpose behind the
77
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39.  Weber v Trinity Meadows Raceway, Inc., 42
ERC 2063 1996 WL 477049 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
40.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 343-344.
41.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 344;
Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp 2d at 431.
42.  NRDC v Texaco, 800 F. Supp. 1, 26 (D. Del.
1992). 
43.  Powell Duffryn, 913 F. 2d at 79.
44.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
45.  Allegheny Ludlum,187 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
46.  Trinity Meadows, 42 ERC 2063 at 46.
47.  Trout Unlimited, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
[CWA].”48 In stark contrast, “when a per-
mittee falsifies [compliance reports], fails
to maintain supporting records, or
destroys records, the permittee may be
covering up serious violations of effluent
limitations.  Thus, the court cannot
assume that violations of monitoring and
reporting requirements in a permit are
trivial. . . . Such violations undermine the
Act and are considered serious by this
court . . . .”49
3.  Effect of Violations on the 
Environment and Human Health
Some courts have linked the serious-
ness of a violation to the level of actual
environmental harm caused by the viola-
tion, while other courts have acknowl-
edged that “a significant penalty may be
appropriate even absent proof of actual
negative effect.”50 In Universal Tool, the
court found that, even though the defen-
dant had violated its CWA permit more
than 1,900 times during the relevant peri-
od, the lack of material environmental
harm from those violations was a signifi-
cant mitigating factor in the court’s deter-
mination of the seriousness of the viola-
tion.51 The court in Smithfield Foods agreed
that “a substantial reduction in the maxi-
mum statutory penalty is warranted where
the violations caused minimal environ-
mental damage.”52
In contrast, several courts take the
view that, “because actual harm to the
environment is by nature difficult and
sometimes impossible to demonstrate, it
need not be proven to establish that sub-
stantial penalties are appropriate in a
CWA case.”53 Also, “the court may justifi-
ably impose a significant penalty if it finds
there is a risk or potential risk of environ-
mental harm, even absent proof of actual
deleterious effect.”54 Despite the claim
that, “in recognition of the difficulty of
proving harm where the violation is usual-
ly temporally distant from the penalty,
and the science is incomplete, a particu-
larized showing of actual harm is not nec-
essary,” some showing of the probability
of harm is often helpful.55 In a situation
where actual environmental harm can be
shown, all courts agree with the possibili-
ty that; “although they are unquantifiable
… violations are significant.”56 In Borden
Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, a case that involved the illegal
dredging and filling of a wetland area, 
the Eastern District of California assessed
the severity of defendant’s violations by
looking to the violations’ impact on the 
environment, even in the absence of 
specific economic harm to the public.57
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48.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 348 (quot-
ing Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services(TOC), 956 F. Supp. 588,
603 (D.S.C. 1997).
49.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 348.
50.  Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs
of Carrol County Maryland, 82 F. Supp. 2d 464, 471
(D. Md. 2000) (citing Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at
344).
51.  See Universal Tool, 786 F. Supp. at 747-749.
52.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 343 (quot-
ing Friends of the Earth, 956 F. Supp. at 602).
53.  Alleghaney Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 432
(quoting Union Township, 929 F. Supp. 807).
54.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 344 (citing
NRDC v. Texaco, 800 F. Supp. at 21; United States
v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 ELR 21073, 21075 (S.D. Ind.
1991)).
55.  Alleghaney Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
56.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 347.
57.  Borden Ranch Partnership v. Unites States
Army Corps of Engineers, 1999 WL 1797329, 16.
The court emphasized the effects that fill-
ing wetlands would have on the environ-
ment in the future; particularly, the
“diminished effectiveness of these [wet-
land] features in filtering pollutants in the
water system and the decrease in exotic
plant and animal life.”58
Concerning risks to human health,
courts make similar distinctions to those
made when analyzing environmental
harm.  Conceding environmental degrada-
tion by the defendant, the court in Trinity
Meadows Raceway stated that “no evidence
was presented demonstrating that the
discharges caused potential harm to
human health;”59 alluding to the possibil-
ity that a showing of actual harm to
human health was not necessary for a
serious violation to be found.  Another
court found a serious violation where
“failure to timely report spills potentially
put public drinking water at risk.”60
United States v. Gulf Park Water Park, Co.,
exemplifies a case where it could be
shown that “a direct, proximate result” of
defendant’s actions “was the closing by
the state of oyster beds along the shore …
for public health reasons.61
The court in Smithfield Foods pointed
out a common situation: “defendants are
not the sole cause of the degradation and
eutrophication to the river, but their
[actions] clearly contributed to the degra-
dation and eutrophication of the … river
and connected waters.”62 The court in
Gulf Park Water asserted that lessening
penalties in this situation would create
undesirable results when it noted, “[i]f we
required specific proof that particular vio-
lating discharges caused discrete, identifi-
able harms, we would encourage a per-
mittee to ignore the requirements of its
permit “with impunity so long as it dis-
charged into already polluted water.”63 In
contrast, the court in Piney Run took the
position that at least the extent of causa-
tion is important to a determination of
culpability when it stated that “although
the association proved that the plant …
had a deleterious effect on Piney Run, it
did not prove the extent of harm attribut-
able to the Plant or even that the Plant is
the major factor in the demise of Piney
Run as a trout stream.”64
B.  Economic Benefit
As discussed above, “[t]he goal of
economic benefit analysis is to prevent a
violator from profiting from its wrongdo-
ing.”65 Since it is often difficult to prove
precise economic benefit, reasonable
approximations will suffice.66 In making
this determination, “the court must
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58.  Id.
59.  Trinity Meadows Raceway, 42 ELR 2063 at 47.
60.  Alleghney Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
61.  United States v. Gulf Park Water Co., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 854 (S.D. Miss. 1998).
62.  Smithfield Foods 972 F. Supp. at 346.
63.  Gulf Park Water, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
64.  Piney Run, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
65.  Id. (citing Union Township, 150 F.3d at 263);
see also Union Township 929 F. Supp. at 806.  “It would
eviscerate the [CWA] to allow violators to escape
civil penalties on the ground that such penalties
cannot be calculated with precision.”
66.  Piney Run, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (quoting
Smithfield Foods, 191 F.3d at 529); see also Allegheny
Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 437.  “A court may exer-
cise its discretion under the Act in accepting proof
that is imprecise and approximate at best.”
endeavor to reach a ‘rational estimate of
[the violator’s] economic benefit, resolving
uncertainties in favor of a higher estimate.’”67
There are two main elements to the
calculation of economic benefit: “(1) the
benefit that the [defendant] received from
delayed capital spending (i.e., money
saved by delay in issuing and making pay-
ments on general obligation bonds to
finance the construction of the required
pollution control equipment); and (2) the
operating and maintenance (O & M)
expenses for the pollution control equip-
ment that the [defendant] avoided operat-
ing during the period compliance was
delayed.”68 However, “the estimate ‘must
encompass every benefit that violators
received from violation of the law.’”69
In Allegheny Ludlum, the court calcu-
lated economic benefit by examining the
amount that a violator saved by failing to
adequately staff its wastewater treatment
plants, and by delaying expenditures nec-
essary to fund improvements to the
wastewater treatment plant and capital
projects at its facilities.70 The court cal-
culated the “benefits of [defendant’s] pol-
lution control efforts that would have
resulted from twenty-four hour staffing,”
after making a determination that “more
than 90% of comparable [facilities] had 24
hour staffing during [the relevant peri-
od].”71 In NRDC v Texaco, the court found
that “the refinery had benefited economi-
cally from its failure to improve internal
investigation practices and had never
evaluated the impact of its violations on
the receiving waters”72 In Cedar Point, the
court considered the amount of money
that the defendant corporation did not
spend on compliance and was therefore
able to use for other income producing
activities, such as investing money back
into the business, when it calculated the
economic benefit.73
Additionally, the court may apply an
interest rate to determine the present
value of the avoided or delayed costs.74
Costs avoided by violating the CWA are
calculated using the weighted average
cost of capital (WACC) as a discount inter-
est rate.  The WACC is the average rate of
return a company expects to make to
maintain its current level of business
operations.75 The Fourth Circuit has
accepted this as an acceptable method of
calculating economic benefit.76
C.  History of Violations
In Smithfield Foods the court noted
ominously that “this is not the first time
defendants have been sued for violations
under the CWA.”77 In Allegheny Ludlum, the
court noted that defendant had previous-
ly “settled almost a thousand CWA viola-
tions . . . in administrative actions.”78 The
court also considered “pollution incidents
reported by . . . inspectors but not includ-
80
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67.  Union Township, 929 F. Supp. at 806.
68.  Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. City and
County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1387 (D.
Hawaii 1993)..
69.  Id. at 806.
70.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 437.
71.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 437.
72.  NRDC v. Texaco, 800 F. Supp. 1 (1992).
73.  See Cedar Point. 73 F.3d at 574.
74.  Smithfield Foods, 191 F.3d at 531.
75.  United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,
191 F.3d 516, 530-31 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Smithfield
Foods, 972 F. Supp at 349 n.18).
76.  Id.
77.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 349.
78.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 433. 
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ed in the allegation in this case, and the
violations resolved by . . . consent orders,
to fall within the broad range of informa-
tion available for assessing [defendant’s]
history of CWA violations.”79
However, “whether defendants have
committed similar violations in the
past”80 is only part of the court’s analysis
of a history of violation.  The duration of
defendant’s current violations are also
considered.”81 Although some courts
consider duration of current violations as
part of their determination of the serious-
ness of a violation, the categories often
overlap.  For example, where “defendants’
violations occurred daily and uninterrupt-
ed for over twelve (12) years,” the court
found that “the discharge is serious solely
by virtue of its duration.”82
D.  Good Faith Efforts to Comply
Defendants’ eventual compliance
with the CWA have been placed by courts
at most every level of the good faith spec-
trum.  The court in Allegheny Ludlum looked
favorably upon defendant’s “compliance
record in years since the lawsuit was filed,
the substantial amount it has spent of
environmental compliance in that time,
and an uncontested record of keeping
commitments to regulatory agencies.”83
In noting that “defendants do get some
credit for their steps, although slow, that
they have taken to eliminate their future
effluent violations,”84 the court recognizes
progress towards compliance as a show-
ing of good faith.  In NRDC v. Texaco, even
though “it took Texaco some eight years to
solve a problem it considered to be press-
ing” the court found good faith because
the delay could be attributed to the fact
that Texaco “worked assiduously to obtain
and install the best available technology
in the area.”85
As noted in Piney Run, not all courts
are so forgiving: “the county’s leisurely
pace, the court finds, cancels out its earli-
er efforts to come into compliance.”86 In
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that
defendant’s expenditure of $2.5 million to
correct past violations, was insufficient to
avoid paying penalties under the CWA.87
In that case, the court found that the only
way the defendant could have avoided a
penalty would have been for it to cease
operations until it could operate without
violating the requirements of its NPDES
permit.88 Because the defendant chose to
continue operations, it must “bear the
consequences of that decision.”89 The
court in Gulf Park Water had no patience at
all for foot dragging by the defendants
when it held that “[defendant] has not
acted promptly, has not acted reasonably,
and has not acted in good faith to the
public … or this court.”90
The court in Smithfield Foods refused to
find any good-faith efforts at compliance
because the defendant’s violations of the
CWA became more frequent over time and
81
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79.  Id.
80.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 349.
81.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 349.
82.  Gulf Park Water, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
83.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
84.  Smithfield Foods 972 F. Supp. at 350.
85.  NRDC v Texaco, 800 F. Supp. at 26.
86.  Piney Run, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
87.  Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d at 1141-1142.
88.  Id.  
89.  Id.
90.  Gulf Park Water, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
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their apparent regard for the importance
of achieving compliance eventually van-
ished.”91 Using similar reasoning, the
court in NRDC v Texaco found that while
“Texaco has consistently violated its per-
mit, its violations have historically
declined in number and size. This argues
against imposition of the maximum pos-
sible penalty.”92
The court in Smithfield Foods stated
that to show good faith a defendant must
do more than merely hire consultants to
recommend ways that a facility may come
into compliance with the CWA.93 If a
defendant hires consultants but ignores
the consultants’ advice and fails to imple-
ment suggestions, then the defendant has
not shown good-faith efforts to comply
with the CWA.94
Courts have sometimes found that a
defendant’s failure to take affirmative
steps to ensure compliance with the CWA
precludes a finding of good-faith efforts at
compliance.    The Smithfield Foods court
refused to find good faith efforts, noting
that “defendant’s efforts at compliance
could have been more vigorous,” and that
the defendant “did not take all of the nec-
essary steps to investigate the disappear-
ance of the documents, or prevent such
destruction in the future”95
Courts in general are sympathetic to
violations that are the result of apparent
mistakes of fact or law. The Piney Run court
stated that was “aware that the CWA is a
strict liability statute, but courts have dis-
cretion to adjust damages based on cul-
pability.”96 Good-faith efforts at compli-
ance have been found when “[defendant]
did not consider these discharges to 
be permit violations, and the court 
finds that this interpretation was not
unreasonable.”97
Courts also consider a defendant’s
compliance with state regulations to be a
showing of a good-faith effort to comply
with the requirements of the federal
CWA.98 For example, the court in Piney
Run held that “because the law was
unclear and the County had a good faith
belief in the permit shield doctrine, the
court finds that a downward adjustment
of the penalty would be appropriate.”99
Similarly, courts have little patience for
defendants who are keenly aware of their
lack of compliance.  Where, breaches were
not due to a lack of knowledge, for
instance if employees self-reported their
frequent violations,100 courts have not
found that defendants acted in good faith.
Similarly, the court in Marine Shale stating
that defendant “knew that it needed an
NPDES permit ... and simply decided to
operate without one,”101 characteriz-
ed defendant’s “violations willful and 
flagrant.”102
The court in Smithfield Foods found that
a defendant’s reasons for coming into
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91.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 350.
92.  NRDC v Texaco, 800 F. Supp. at 25.
93.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 351.
94.  Id.
95.  Smithfield Foods 972 F. Supp. at 352.
96.  Piney Run, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
97.  Id.
98.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 353.
99.  Piney Run, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
100.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
101.  Gulf Park Water, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
102.  Id.
compliance with their permit had no bear-
ing on the question of whether the action
was taken in good faith.  The court argued
that coming into compliance exhibited
good faith “regardless of whether they
elected to [come into compliance with
their permit] for environmental or eco-
nomic reasons or both.”103 Several other
courts hotly contest this assertion.  When
defendant “failed to apply for [a permit]
until one day prior to the preliminary
injunction hearing,” the Trinity Meadows
Raceway court stated that it could not find
good-faith attempts to comply with a
court order, much less the CWA.104 When
the stated reasons for a sudden focus on
environmental compliance—“increased
agency enforcement, increasingly punitive
enforcement, . . . growth in criminal pros-
ecutions,” and “increased expenditures 
for spill prevention and control proj-
ects”—only commenced when enforce-
ment increased, the court in Allegheny
Ludlum refused to make a finding of good
faith.105 The court also stated that “these
notes and documents … portray a corpo-
rate management and legal department
that is recalcitrant, reactive and loath to
fully disclose is problems.”106
E.  Economic Impact of the 
Penalty on the Violator
Courts consider a variety of indica-
tors of financial stability in order to assess
the economic impact of a penalty on a
given defendant.  “One such indicator is
the stockholder’s equity, which is the net
of a company’s total assets minus total
liabilities, and which gives a good indica-
tion of the size of the company.”107 Other
indicators are a company’s book value, 10-
K and gross sales or liquidity.108 Courts
have also held that “it is appropriate to
consider parent’s financial condition in
assessing a penalty under the CWA.”109
Internal documents can also be relevant,
as was the case in Allegheny Ludlum where
the court noted a document that “specifi-
cally references this lawsuit and states
that ‘management does not believe the
disposition [of this matter] is likely to
have a material adverse effect on the com-
pany’s financial condition or liquidity.’”110
The court may also draw the conclusion
that continued violations in the face of
past fines are an indication that past “sub-
stantial fines apparently were inadequate
to deter continued violations of the
act”111 and that larger penalties will not
be unduly burdensome.  Similarly, if a
court is convinced that “imposition of the
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103.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 350. 
104.  Trinity Meadows Raceway, 42 ERC 2063 at
48.
105.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 435.
106.  Id.
107.  Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 353.
108.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 441-
442.
109.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 442
(citing Union Township, 150 F. 3d at 268).
110.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 441-
442.
111.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 445
(citing NRDC v. Texaco, 800 F. Supp. at 25).
maximum penalty will have a more drastic
effect on the [defendant] than is needed
to ensure future compliance,”112 the court
will take aspect of the case into account.
However, “defendants have the burden 
of showing that the impact of a 
penalty could be ruinous or otherwise 
disabling.”113
Courts also take into account factors
beyond the financial resources of a specif-
ic defendant.  One such court, in Allegheny,
noted with sympathy that “the steel
industry in the United States is undergo-
ing a brutal restructuring.”114 In that par-
ticular case, “the evidence at trial, howev-
er, did not demonstrate that a substantial
penalty would damage the overall health
of [the defendant].”115
In recognizing the unique situation of
municipalities regulated by the CWA, the
court in Piney Run pointed out that while
“a large penalty passed on to consumers
in the form of higher prices may have a
significant effect on a private polluter, a
municipal polluter merely passes the
costs on to its taxpayers who, in turn,
have no option other than to pay the
tax.”116 However, in Trout Unlimited, the
court found that the economic impact of a
substantial penalty would not work an
undue burden on the defendant, a Water
Board, where the board maintained a
large reserve fund and was able to pass
the cost onto consumers, with minimal
negative effect on those consumers.117
F.  Other Matters as Justice May 
Require
Defendants may be “entitled to some
credit for their lack of bad faith.”118
However, when a court is convinced that
defendants acted in bad faith, it takes
note.  A classic example of a court finding
bad faith action by a defendant is noted in
Allegheny Ludlum:
One notorious ALC oil spill …
spread … nearly 30 miles down-
stream … The Coast Guard esti-
mated that the oil must have
been flowing for nearly a day to
have reached that far down-
stream … Even though the spill
was miles long, and the ALC was
told by the Coast Guard about
the spill, ALC eventually report-
ed the spill as a “small quantity
of water containing oil” being
discharged.119 In general, how-
ever, there is a high bar to be
overcome to actually show bad
faith.  For example the court in
NRDC v Texaco, in finding no
bad faith present, stated that
“there are instances where
Texaco and its employees acted
incompletely, incompetently, or
even irresponsibly, but nothing
convinces us that the company
acted with an evil motive.”120
Aside from bad faith action, courts
often give weight to a defendant’s bad
attitude toward compliance.  In Smithfield
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112.  Trinity Meadows Raceway, 42 ERC 2063 at 17.
113.  Gulf Park Water, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
114. Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
115.  Id..
116.  Piney Run, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
117.  See Id.
118.   Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 351.
119.   Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
120.   NRDC v. Texaco, 800 F. Supp. at 26. 
Foods, the court found that the defendant’s
bad attitude towards compliance was
enough to outweigh the defendant’s
apparent lack of bad-faith actions.121 The
court in Allegheny Ludlum took similar
notice of the defendants attitude toward
compliance when it noted that, “the case
has not reached this level of enforcement
without serious questions about the level
of ALC’s commitment to the obligations
imposed by the Act.”122 The court went
on to conclude that “if the attitude that
began to prevai l… in the face of height-
ened enforcement and scrutiny had exist-
ed in 1988, then most of the violations at
issue in this lawsuit would not have
occurred.”123 The court inferred the
defendant’s attitude from the fact that
when, “defendants only achieved compli-
ance after the United States filed a Motion
for an Order of Contempt.”124
Courts may also consider a defen-
dant’s inability to comply with the terms
of his/her permit “due to a lack of neces-
sary technology or to a lack of financial
resources.”125 Conversely, the court
weighs a defendant’s ability to comply.
For instance, the court in Allegheny Ludlum
noted that the defendant “easily could
have afforded to make the necessary envi-
ronmental expenditures and would have
remained very profitable.”126
IV.  Conclusion
In conclusion, there is no magic bul-
let to ensure that substantial penalties
will be ordered against violators of the
Clean Water Act.  The more negatively a
defendant appears with regards to the six
factors in Section 309(d), the more likely
the defendant is to receive a substantial
penalty from the court.  Each court has
been careful to note, the six factors are
part of a balancing test that is specific to
the facts of each individual case.  In the
end, if the weight of even one factor is
extremely compelling, a stronger case will
need to be made for the others.  For exam-
ple, when a court is convinced that a
defendant made significant good faith
efforts to comply with the CWA, a sub-
stantial penalty is less likely to be ordered
if plaintiffs cannot show actual harm to
human health or the environment.
Conversely, when a court is convinced
that a defendant has acted in bad faith, it
is likely to order substantial penalties
even in the absence of any showing of
actual deleterious effects.
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121.   Smithfeild Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 353.
122.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
123.  Id. at 436.
124.  Gulf Park Water, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
125.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 436;
see also Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 353.
126.  Allegheny Ludlum, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
Civil Penalties in Citizen Suits Resource Guide
1. The Yellow Book: The EPA's Guide to Environmental Enforcement and Compliance
at Federal Facilities: at www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/civil/feder-
al/yellowbk.pdf.
A comprehensive informational tool to help agencies comply with environmental
regulations and understand the enforcement and compliance processes.
2. Save the Clean Water Act: at www.savethecleanwateract.org
Website with news links and means to send interactive letters to the U.S. Congress.
3. Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 833 (1985).
Analyzes the first wave of citizen suits brought by environmental organizations under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA) and their efficacy as devices for
regulatory enforcement.
4. EPA "Enforcement Alert" Newsletter at www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/newslet-
ters/civil/enfalert/index.html
Website informing the public and regulated community of important environmental
enforcement issues, trends and significant enforcement actions.
5. Environmental Media Services: at www.ems.org/cleanwater/sub2_cleanwater.html
Current information on environmental issues, including organizations filing amicus
briefs in support of CWA citizen suit enforcement.
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